Abstract
Introduction
Digital identities and profiles are more and more relevant to enable Internet transactions and interactions among citizens, service providers, enterprises and government institutions. Confidential information (including personal data, financial details, business data) needs to be disclosed in order to enable these interactions. Particularly interesting is the case where Internet interactions span across multiple parties (in B2C, B2B and government scenarios) due to sub-contracting, outsourcing and integration of services supplied by multiple providers.
Personal identity and profile information is precious and valuable to organisations: it can be used to improve and customise services and to provide statistical, strategic and marketing information. On the other hand, misuses and unauthorised leakages of this information can violate users' privacy, cause frauds and encourage spamming.
People perceive and address the related security and privacy issues in different ways, ranging from completely ignoring them (and indiscriminately disclosing their personal data) to being so concerned to prevent them from using any Internet and web-based applications.
Identity and privacy management solutions are going to play a key role in protecting identities and profiles, enforcing good management practices and helping to detect criminal activities and support forensic analysis.
These solutions need to simplify users' experience so that people can feel they are in control of their confidential data and that this data is managed in an accountable way. If people are not willing to be involved in the active protection and management of their digital assets, trusted third parties could do this on their behalf and could provide them with easy-to-use tools to monitor and keep the situation under control.
Addressed problem and related work
In this paper we address the problem of providing people with more control over their personal information and enforce accountable management of such information.
In order to describe some of the involved aspects, we refer to a multi-party e-commerce scenario. In no way are the issues and aspects we highlight limited to this sector, as they are common to financial, government and enterprise areas.
In this e-commerce scenario users deal with electronic transactions that span across multiple e-commerce sites. A person initially provides their digital identity and profile information to an e-commerce site in order to access their services, possibly after negotiations about which privacy policies need to be applied (description of such a negotiation process is beyond the scope of this paper). Then the user logs in and interacts with these services: it might happen that in so doing he/she needs to involve other web sites or organisations. The e-commerce site might need to disclose personal data to third parties (such as suppliers, information providers, government and financial institutions, etc.) in order to fulfill the specific transaction. The involved e-commerce sites do not necessarily have prior agreements or belong to the same web of trust.
The above scenario highlights a few key issues: how to fulfill users' privacy rights, make enterprises more accountable and allow users to be in control of their information.
In general, users have little understanding or knowledge of the privacy laws and legislation that regulate the management of their information and their implications. In addition, further complexity arises due to the fact that privacy laws can differ quite substantially depending on national and geographical aspects. For example in US privacy laws restrict what the government can do with personal data but they introduce few restrictions on trading of personally identifiable information by private enterprises. In Europe (EU) people can consent to have their personally identifiable information used for commercial purposes but the default is to protect that information and not allow it to be used indiscriminately for marketing purposes.
Little has been done so far to directly involve users (or entities acting on their behalf) in the explicit management and enforcement of privacy policies, especially in a context of multiparty interactions. Users have lack of control over their personal information, especially after the initial disclosures. In addition third parties (such as delegates, e-commerce sites or enterprises) have lack of control over the confidential information they manage on behalf of their customers, in particular when they disclose it to other organisations, during transactions or interactions. In most cases it is a matter of trust.
Mechanisms such as W3C's Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [16] allow users to define simple privacy policies but only for point-to-point interactions.
Liberty Alliance [10] and Microsoft Passport [11] efforts in federated identity management are (for the time being) based on a closed web of trust. Identity providers must be part of trusted clubs and be compliant with predefined privacy policies. This approach limits scalability and flexibility of the allowed interactions and transactions.
Seminal work towards a more fine-grained control over the privacy of personal information has been described by [8, 9] . In paper [8] the authors defines a privacy control language that includes user consent, obligations and distributed administration. They introduce the core elements of privacy policies and their formalisation. In paper [9] the authors describe a platform for enterprise privacy practices (E-P3P). They introduce the "sticky policy" paradigm and mechanisms for enterprise privacy enforcement. Particularly interesting is the concept of "sticky policy": when submitting data to an enterprise, a user consents to the applicable privacy policies along with selected opt-in and opt-out choices. Sticky policies are strictly associated to users' data and drive access control decisions and privacy enforcement.
Papers [8, 9] do not describe how the strong associations between policies and confidential data is enforced, especially across enterprise boundaries. Users still need to trust the enterprise when disclosing their data. Leakage of personal and confidential information might happen, despite data protection laws and privacy policies, because of lack of security, dishonesty of some of the involved intermediaries and the complexity of the overall systems.
In this paper we extend the work done in [8, 9] by suggesting mechanisms to strongly associate disclosure policies to personal data and increase the accountability of the involved parties.
Proposed model and technical solution

Model
The proposed model extends [8, 9] by including the following key aspects:
• Obfuscation of (any aggregation of) personal information before it leaves users' premises, in order to protect its content; • Association of "tamper resistant" sticky policies defined by users (or trusted third parties, acting on their behalf) to the obfuscated data, to explicitly declare the relevant disclosure constraints; • Disclosure of data subject to the fulfillment of the sticky policies' constraints, checked by Tracing Authorities, i.e., trusted third parties; • Active involvement of users in disclosures of their data; • Enforced tracing and auditing of disclosures of confidential data, to increase data receivers' accountability via Tracing Authorities. In this model people use graphical tools to: locally author their disclosure policies (i.e., sticky policies) in a finegrained way; obfuscate their confidential data by directly using these disclosure policies; associate these policies to the obfuscated data (by creating digital packages).
Some of the above activities can be automated by using predefined policy templates and scripts.
Digital packages containing obfuscated data along with their sticky policies can be provided by users (engaging in electronic interactions and transactions) to requestors, for example e-commerce sites. These digital packages might contain a superset of the required information, to reduce the number of users' interactions. Selective disclosure [14] of (part of) their contents will be authorised, depending on needs.
A requestor has to demonstrate to the Tracing Authority that he/she understands the involved terms and conditions. A Tracing Authority checks for the integrity and trustworthiness of the requestor's credentials and their IT environment, accordingly to the disclosure policies.
The actual disclosure of any obfuscated data only happens after the requestor demonstrates to the Tracing Authority that it can satisfy the associated sticky policies.
The owner of the confidential information can be actively involved in the disclosure process by asking for their authorizations or by notifications, as specified by the agreed disclosure policies. In our model nothing prevents the owner of the confidential information from running a Tracing Authority himself/herself.
Disclosures of confidential data are logged and audited by the Tracing Authority. This increases the accountability of the requestors by creating evidence about their knowledge of users' confidential data.
Multiple Tracing Authorities can be used in the above process in order to minimise the risks involved in the management of trust, for example having to rely only on one entity.
Technical solution
The technical solution that implements the above model leverages two key technologies:
• Identifier-based Encryption (IBE) [2, 4, 5] : an emerging cryptographic schema where any kind of sequence of bytes or string (including a name, a role, terms and conditions, etc.) can be used as encryption keys. The generation of the corresponding IBE decryption key can be postponed until later. A Trust Authority (TA) (a type of trusted third party) can generate this decryption key on the fly, under specific circumstances. More details about the core IBE properties are described in [17] .
• Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) technology [15] : this provides mechanisms and tools to check the integrity of computer platforms and their installed software. For further discussion of TCPA capabilities, see [13, 17] . In our technical solution a "sticky policy" is mapped to an "IBE encryption key". The "Tracing Authority" is a "Trust Authority".
IBE encryption keys can be modelled to define any kind of constraints or terms and conditions. At the very base an IBE encryption key is a string: it is selfexplanatory and is directly used to encrypt confidential data. An IBE encryption key does stick with the encrypted data. Any alteration or tampering of this string will make impossible to the Trust Authority to generate the correct IBE decryption key.
No secret needs to be generated and exchanged between users and the receivers of confidential information. The Trust Authority (TA) will generate the IBE decryption key on the fly, when required. After describing the high-level architecture for our solution, we will move on to consider how: sticky policies are used; policies can be enforced; multiple TAs can be involved, including users' TAs; non-compliance can be tracked. Figure 1 shows the architecture and components of a distributed system implementing our model: Identity or profile information is protected by encryption with sticky policies before its disclosure to third parties (A), by means of convenient plug-ins or trusted applications. These policies are used as IBE encryption keys (public keys) and might include: references to logical names of identity and profile attribute(s); disclosure constraints; obligations; actions (i.e., notification of the owner in case of multiparty disclosure); lifetime, etc.
To obtain a valid IBE decryption key (B), the receiver needs to interact with TAs and provide information (including authentication credentials, business related information, company/individual policy related to data disclosure, usage and storage, software state, platform configuration etc.) as required by the disclosure policies. In doing this, the receiver is explicitly aware of (and understands) these policies.
As part of this process, an extension of the TCPA integrity checking mechanisms [15] can be used to check that the receiver's platform is a trusted computing platform, that the software state of this platform is conformant with the disclosure policies and that the platform correctly implements defined privacy management mechanisms.
A TA will issue a decryption key (D) if it acknowledges the compliance with the disclosure policies.
Before doing this it might interact with the information owner (C) to ask for his/her authorization or notification. The TA traces and stores all the information exchanged during these interactions in audit-trails, as evidence for future contentions or forensic analysis.
The remaining part of this section provides more details about some of the key aspects of our technical solution.
Sticky policies
Users' identity and profile information is exchanged by means of data packages and the associated sticky policies.
An example of a data package, containing obfuscated data along with its sticky policies, is as follows: In the above example the data package relates to only one confidential attribute (i.e. piece of data, for example a credit card number), for simplicity. The associated sticky policy contains:
• An encrypted "identifier" of the owner. This can be any type of information, including the owner's e-mail address, URL, etc. Note that a "reference name" (a pseudonym, for example) has been used as an IBE encryption key to encrypt this information. Only the competent Trust Authority will be able to retrieve the owner's identifier (and use it, for example, to notify the owner of a disclosure or ask for an authorization).
• The name of the attached confidential attribute.
• An expiration date: date after which the Trust Authority will not issue anymore the IBE decryption key.
• Constraints, obligations and actions: these constrain the requestor to strongly authenticate to the Trust Authority (for example by using PKI-based X.509 identity certificates [7] ) and specify the usage of the attribute. An additional constraint is to notify the user of a disclosure. Sticky policies (disclosure policies) can be used to allow a selective disclosure of any aggregation and combination of confidential information; they can be associated in a fine-grained way to any kind of attribute.
They can be composed and extended in a very flexible way. We use an XML-based representation as matter of convenience. Any kind of constraint, obligation and permission can be added, as long as the Trust Authority (TA) and the receivers understand its semantics.
The receiver of the encrypted information (for example an identity provider or an e-commerce site) can programmatically interpret the associated disclosure policies by means of a policy engine.
We are currently refining key aspects of our sticky policies, including hierarchies of policies, composition of policies and their mapping at different levels of abstraction (service, application, system and OS).
Policy Enforcement
TCPA integrity checking mechanisms [15] can be used to allow the TA('s) platform to be checked out by the user (to make sure that the TA will operate as expected) and/or the recipient of the data (to help the recipient decide whether the TA can be trusted with the information that the recipient needs to provide to the TA in order for the decryption key to be issued).
An analogous approach may be used with other types of trusted platform that use a trusted hardware device as a root of trust, and not necessarily just those compliant with the TCPA specification. For example, the enforcement could be provided by using similar mechanisms within Microsoft's Palladium/NGSCB [12] .
Furthermore, Trusted Operating Systems (OSs) can be used to increase security and trust, for example by storage of sensitive information that the receiver needs to disclose to the TA within one or more separate OS compartments. The technology required to implement the above solution is currently available and has been developed by HP Labs, Bristol, UK.
In particular, TCPA integrity checking mechanisms can be used to allow: the TA's platform to be checked out by the user; the TA's platform to be checked out by the recipient of the data; the recipient's platform to be checked out by the TA; the recipient's platform to be checked out by the user; analogous checking by the recipient for further data forwarding to a third party. In general, it is the TA(s) that controls the disclosure of data, and not the receiver. However, this is not always the case. Protection can be given against the disclosure policy being contravened, in at least two ways:
• Via the receiver's own platform, via enforcement mechanisms on that platform that enforce policies defined by data wrappers or tags, or enforce the platform's policies relating to treatment of data. For example, this enforcement could be carried out at the OS level or by passing control to a TCPA-compliant Trusted Platform's Trusted Platform Module (TPM); • If the data is disclosed to a third party using the mechanisms described in this document, the TA could check that this disclosure has been carried out according to the specification of the (original) disclosure policy.
Multiple TAs
The receiver may have to use multiple TAs in order to access user's data. For example, one TA might be competent with respect to security platforms and other might be competent in privacy, so it would make sense for both to carry out checks before allowing an entity to access data. The IBE cryptography schema provides these functionalities [18] . In this case, the user might encrypt the data using a disclosure policy that specifies that it is necessary to use two (or more) IBE sub keys in order to decrypt the data, and each of the TAs would provide one of these keys. Multiple IBE keys might be needed to decrypt the same piece of data, or different data fields might be encrypted using different keys. Multiple TAs might also be needed when data is forwarded from the receiver to another entity. The receiver might use a different TA, in which case the third party would have to apply to that TA to get the decryption key, etc., as described above.
Owners of identity and profile information can run their own TA services to have first hand understanding of what happens to their information and make ultimate decisions.
Accountability management
If the receiver discloses data in a way that is not contemplated by the policies he previously agreed, there is an audit trail (at the TA(s) site(s)) showing that he/she actually understood and agreed with those policies.
In case of identity or profile thefts, the audit information can be used to pin down a list of potential "offenders" and carry on forensic analysis. Enforcing the tracing and auditing of disclosures makes the information receivers more accountable.
Discussion
The idea of using trusted third parties to mediate the access to confidential information is not new. There are well-known related issues, including why a person or an organisation should trust a third party. Multiple trusted third parties can be involved in order to minimise the risk of having to trust or rely only on an entity. In our specific case, multiple Trust Authorities (Tracing Authorities) could be involved in the process of issuing IBE decryption keys: data owners could run their own Trust Authorities.
We believe that the value we bring in this area is in the mechanisms we provide to associate "tamper resistant" disclosure policies (sticky policies) to confidential data, the interaction model adopted to force requestors to be traced (audited) and the technology used to check the integrity and trustworthiness of remote IT environments.
In terms of obfuscation of users' data, traditional RSA cryptography (based on public/private keys), PKCS#7 enveloping techniques and PKI can be used to provide functionalities similar to IBE's. We believe IBE technology simplifies the management of obfuscated data (at least at the users' site) by providing a model that naturally fits with the required interaction model.
A Trust Authority (Tracing Authority) is the right place to implement tracing and auditing activities and check for sticky policies compliance. Requestors do need to interact with the Trust Authority to obtain an IBE decryption key. The auditing and tracing effort is effective also to audit users' behaviors, as the Trust Authority is a trusted bridge with users.
It is important to notice that once confidential information has been disclosed to a requestor and it is in clear text (at the requestor site), it can be potentially misused. In our model, in case of leakages and misbehaviors, the tracing and auditing information can be used for forensic analysis to pin down responsibilities.
Current literature, including papers [8, 9] , recommends that enterprises define their own privacy and security policies, in a way that it is compliant with laws and legislation. To programmatically implement these policies they need policy engines integrated with traditional authentication and access control components.
The model and technical solution described in this paper are complementary to the above aspects: they leverage IBE technology along with a TA service infrastructure to reduce the involved risks by increasing accountability, keep users in the disclosure loop and avoid unauthorized disclosures of information. In this context TCPA technology is used to do pre-emptive trust and security checks.
Current and future work
Two core technologies are used to implement our model: IBE and TCPA. They are currently available at HP Labs and on the market. In particular TSL (HP Labs, Bristol) has implemented an optimised version of the IBE code that provides IBE cryptography functions with a performance comparable to RSA-based code. TCPA chips and PCs are available on the market.
We currently have simple implementations of most of the components required by our technical solution, including a Trusted Authority service, a user add-in to author sticky policies and a policy driven (and context aware) authorization engine [3] . Work is in progress to build a non-repudiable logging and auditing system [1] . We are also working on tagged-OS as a mechanism to enforce (parts of) sticky policies directly at the OS level.
Our aim is to refine our model and learn by building and deploying the system in a real-life environment.
Conclusion
In this paper we specifically address two important problems: letting users be more in control of their personal data and privacy and making enterprises be more accountable of their behaviours, whilst dealing with users' confidential data.
Our research is in progress. We introduced and described a model based on "sticky policies" to strictly associate "tamper resistant" privacy policies to obfuscated data, along with trusted tracing services. We described a technical solution where IBE technology coupled with TCPA are used to address the above problems.
These core technologies are available at HP Labs Bristol, along with simple implementations of most of the required solution components. Work is in progress to build a full working prototype and make experiments in real-world contexts.
